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Sabella et al.: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
UNITED STATES V. DUNCAN: THE PROSECUTION OF
FALSE STATEMENTS MADE TO GOVERNMENT
AGENTS UNDER 18 USC § 1001
A.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Duncan,! the Ninth Circuit held that
when a declarant makes an affirmative false statement2 to a government investigator, which could have influenced or affected a
governmental function,3 the statement is punishable under 18
U.S.C. section 1001.4
On April 3, 1982, two special agents of United States Customs were on duty at the Los Angeles International Airport, observing travelers about to board a flight to Bolivia. 1I Noticing defendant's behavior, the agents became suspicious that he might
1. 693 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were
Burna, D.J., sitting by designation, and Fletcher, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing
an "affirmative" false statement as more than a mere "no" answer to a question posed by
a government agent).
3. 693 F.2d at 976 (citing United States v. Carrier, 654 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1981)
(where the court stated that the test for determining the materiality of a falsification was
whether the statement influenced or affected a governmental function».
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by an trick, scheme, or
device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
[d.
5. The agents' assignment was to "survey and, if necessary, search departing passengers to ensure the compliance of international travelers with federal currency laws." 693
F.2d at 973.
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be a currency smuggler. s When the agents questioned the defendant about the amount of money he was carrying out of the
country, the defendant responded falsely that he' possessed an
amount under the legal limit. 7 The agents searched the defendant and discovered that he was carrying more than that
amount.s They arrested him and charged him with lying to government agents in violation of section 1001, and with violating
the currency reporting statute,' 31 U.S.C. section 5316. 9
The defendant was convicted on the section 1001 count.lO
He appealed, contending that he could not be convicted under
section 1001, because (1) there was a narrower, more specific
statute which applied, (2) his statement was not material within
the meaning of section 1001, and (3) his statement came under
the "exculpatory no" exception l l to the application of the statute. 12 A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the decision of the
6. The defendant was standing at the departure gate when he attracted the agents'
attention. The agents found his behavior suspicious because he did not "have the same
demeanor as the other passengers and did not appear ... to be someone looking forward.
to a trip out of the United States." [d. The defendant was traveling alone, not talking to
anyone, and appeared to be looking for someone. The agents believed that he met the
narcotics/currency profile used by Customs to identify potential offenders. [d.
7. The agents asked the defendant if he had anything to report to Customs prior to
his departure. The defendant answered in the negative, and then offered, "I know I have
to report anything over $5,000, but I have only $5,000." [d. at 974.
,
8. The defendant was carrying over $21,000, hidden in several places on his body.
[d.
9. [d.; The government dismissed the § 5316 count and proceeded to trail solely on
the § 1001 charge. [d. at 973. See supra note 4 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; 31 U.S.C. §
5316 (1982) (amending 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[AJ person ..
. shall file a report . . . when the person . . . knowingly . . . transports . . . monetary
instruments of more than $5,000 at one time ... from a place in the United States to or
through a place outside the United States .... " [d.).
10. [d.

11. The "exculpatory no" exception is a judically engrafted exception to the statute,
first adopted by the circuit courts in Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 309
(5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit held that mere "no" answers denying
involvement in criminal activity, given in response to questions initiated by the government, without any affirmative, aggressive or overt misstatement on the part of the defendant were not within the scope of § 1001.
12. The defendant raised two other substantive grounds for reversal. First, the defendant contended that the evidence against him should have been excluded because the
stop and search at the airport was illegal, to wit, the agents stopped and searched the
defendant without a warrant or probable cause. 693 F.2d at 974. Second, the defendant
argued that his statements were inadmissible because they were made during a custodial
interrogation before Miranda warnings were given. The defendant made his first statement before the agents had probable cause to believe he had violated the currency statutes. He made another statement after the agents discovered that he had violated those
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District Court. 18
B.

BACKGROUND

1. Legislative History:

Section 1001 provides that it is a federal offense to give a
false statement to a government agent.l4 The statute prohibits
statutes. 1d. at 979.
In response to the defendant's first contention, the majority pointed out that the
Ninth Circuit has held that a person leaving the United States may be stopped and
searched without probable cause or any suspicion, pursuant to border search principles.
1d. at 977 (citing United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978». But see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977)
(where the Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of making border searches of
incoming travelers only). The majority noted that the Supreme Court has stated in dictum that such searches do not violate the fourth amendment. 693 F.2d at 977 (citing
California Bankers Assn v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974) (where the Supreme Court
stated in dictum that no violation of the fourth amendment occurs when those entering
and leaving the country are "examined as to their belongings and effecta."» The majority argued that a border search of departing travelers comports with the fourth amendment, unless, considering the scope of the intrusion and the manner of its conduct, the
search violates "reasonableness". 603 F.2d at 977 (citing United States v. GuadalupeGarza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970) (where the Supreme Court stated that in the
context of a border search reasonableness in "incapable of comprehensive definition or of
mechanical application".» Under this rule, the majority determined that the stop and
search of the defendant was reasonable. The search occurred at the "functional
equivalent" of a border and there was no indication that the manner in which the search
was conducted was unreasonable. The search was no longer than necessary to ensure that
no laws were violated and was conducted out of the public view. 693 F.2d at 978.
The dissent argued, however, that the stop and search was illegal on both statutory
and constitutional grounds. First, the dissent pointed out that 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1976),
which grants Customs explicit authority to search travelers for unreported currency,
plainly requires a warrant. 693 F.2d at 982. Second, the dissent cited United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), to show that the Supreme Court recognizes the constitutionality of border searches with respect to incoming travelers only. 693 F.2d at 983. The.
dissent maintained that the stop and search was illegal because the customs agents were
unrestricted as to when and where they might perform the currency search involved in
Duncan. 1d. The defendant had no notice that he might be searched. He was singled out
solely because of his "supposedly" suspicious behavior. [d.
In response to the defendant's second contention, the majority stated that the rule
in the Ninth Circuit requires that Miranda warnings need not be given in border crossing
situations "unless and until the questioning agents have probable cause to believe that
the person questioned has committed an offense." 1d. at 979 (quoting, United States v.
Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1980». The majority recognized that under
this rule, one of the defendant's statements should have been excluded. 693 F.2d at 979.
It concluded that the error was not grounds for reversal, however, because there was
sufficient independent evidence of guilt. 1d.
The dissent maintained that the statements obtained from the defendant should
have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal stop and search. 1d. at 984.
13. 693 F.2d at 973.
14. See supra note 4 for text of § 1001.
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false statements which both result in pecuniary or property loss
to the government and which are designed to frustrate the
proper functioning of the regulatory schemes of government. 111
Section 1001 originated in the false claims and related false
statements provisions of the Act of March 2, 1863.16 The original
Act was narrowly drawn to prevent pecuniary loss to the United
States resulting from false claims and related false statements
made by military personnel upon or against the government. 17
From 1863 to 1934, the Act underwent several substantive
changes which broadened its application. 18 Until 1934, the Act
only covered false statements relating to claims that involved
pecuniary or property loss to the government. 19 In 1934, during a
period of national economic crisis, Congress further expanded
the scope of the statute to include statements which impaired
the proper functioning of government agencies. 20 Congress has
15. See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86,93 (1941) (where the Supreme Court
explained that the statute was intended to reach both cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the government and cases where the false statement might pervert the authorized functions of government).
16. The original Act mad it a criminal offense for any person in the military forces
of the United States to make a knowing false claim or related false statement to any
officer or department of the government. Act of March 2, 1863, Ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 504 (1955), where the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the Act was to prevent and punish frauds
upon the Government of the United States, id. at 504, and pointed out that application
of the Act was limited to military personnel. [d. at 504-05.
18. The first revision occurred in 1873, when Congress made the Act applicable to
"every person", instead of only military personnel. Codification of December 1, 1873,
approved June 22, 1874, R.S. § 5438.
The next significant revision occurred in 1918, when Congress extended the reach of
the statute to cover false claims and related false statements given to "corporations in
which the United States of America is a stockholder", in addition to those given to government agencies. Act of October 23, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-228, § 35, 40 Stat. 1015.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926), where the Court emphasized narrow scope of the statute. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not proscribe false statements made to Customs because the purpose of the statement was not
to defraud the government of either its money or its property.
20. The amendment eliminated all worda as to purpose and intent from the false
statements statute. It extended the statue to cover any false statement "knowingly ...
and willfully ... made . . . in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States .... " Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-394, § 35,48 Stat.
996. The purpose of the amendment was to remove the prior limitation of the statute to
cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the government. Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 9293. Congress intended the amendment to protect the authorized functions of government
from the frustration which might result from deceptive practices. [d.
The historical situation which gave rise to the 1934 amendment was described by
the Eighth Circuit:
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not significantly changed the statute since 1934.21
2.

Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court has discussed the scope of section 1001
in three decisions and has held repeatedly that the statute
should be construed broadly in order to protect the proper functioning of the government. In United States u. Gilliland,22 decided soon after the 1934 amendment, the Court established
that th~ application of the statute was not limited to statements
involving pecuniary or property loss to the government.23 The
During the economic collapse of the 1930's the government, at
an accelerated pace, began entering the field of economic reform and regulation. Jurisdiction over various parts of our
economy was being delegated to innumerable federal agencies.
For a proper functioning of their regulative and reform power
these agencies depended upon information supplied by the individuals and corporations with which they were dealing. The
giving of false information to these agencies would, of course,
seriously pe~ert their functions, making effective regulations
impossible. However, a fatal defect in the existing law made
punishment of such fraudulent activity very difficult.
Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967).
18. In 1948, Congress put false claims and reloted false statements provisions into their
present form. The provisions were divided into two separate statutes. The false claims
provisions became 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1969). The false statements provisions is now 18
U.S.C. § 1001. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1001, 62 Stat. 683.
A revision of the criminal code, presently being considered by Congress, would narrow the scope of § 1001. The senate report on the revision suggests that the penalty for a
false "no" given during a criminal investigation in response to questions initiated by the
government should be lessened:
[TJhe somewhat natural propensity to [give a false
noJ-particularly in the context of an oral response to a law
enforcement agent's on-the-spot interrogation-is deemed to
warrant a less severe punishment, since such an exculpatory
denial is not as likely as other false statements to be taken at
face value and thereby to impede or affect the course or outcome of the criminal investigation.
S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 365, 390 (1980). The House Report seeks to remove
altogether oral false statements from the scope of the statute. H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 171,181-82 (1980). The pending legislation is, of course, not binding on
the courts.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
22. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
23. The Supreme Court stated:
The amendment ... broadened the provision so as to leave no
adequate basis for the limited construction which had previously obtained .... [TJhere was no restriction to cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the government. The amendment indicated the congressional intent to protect the
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Court explained that the 1934 amendment reflected the congressional intent to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the frustration which might
result from deceptive practices. 24 A few years later, in United
States v. Bramblett,2G the Court stated that there was no indication in either the committee reports or in the congressional debates that the scope of section 1001 was to be in any way restricted. 26 Most recently, in Bryson v. Ur..ited States,27 the Court
made clear that the statute's jurisdictional requirement is not
grounds to construe section 1001 as if its objects were narrow or
technical. 28 The Court concluded that the term "jurisdiction" as
found within the statute should be interpreted broadly, since
section 1001 is intended to protect the integrity of official
iriquiries. 29
3. Ninth Circuit:

In United States v. Brandow,30 where the defendant submitted a false written denial of involvement in a tax fraud to
investigators of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the panel
construed the statute broadly and held that section 1001 covered
the statement. 31 The panel emphasized that the false statement
concerned a matter within the "jurisdiction" of the IRS, since as
a matter of law the IRS had the power to act on the falsity.32
authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive
practices described [in the statute]. We see no reason why this
apparent intention should be frustrated by construction.
[d. at 93.
24. [d.

25. 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
26. The Supreme Court stated, "[a] greater variety of false statements were meant
to be included [by the 1934 amendment]. There is no indication in either the committee
reports or in the congressional debates that the scope of the statutes was to be in any
way restricted." [d. at 507.
27. 396 U.S. 64 (1969).
28. [d.• at 70-7 (citing Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1962)
(where the court held that "jurisdiction" in section 1001 should not be interpreted as if
its meaning were narrow or technical».
29. The Supreme Court held that, "[a] statutory basis for an agency's request for
information provides jurisdiction enough to punish fraudulent statements under § 1001."
396 U.S. at 71.
30. 268 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959) (per Barnes,J.; the other panel members were
Chambers, J., and Jertberg, J.).
31. [d. at 562-65.
32. [d. at 564. The Ninth Circuit held that "a false statement is submitted in a
matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
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The panel also noted that the statement was "material" within
the meaning of section 1001 because the statement had the "intrinsic ability" to frustrate the functions of the agency
involved. 33
In United States v. Bedore,a. where the defendant made an
affirmative false statement .to a special agent of the Federal Bu-.
reau of Investigation (FBI),31i the panel distinguished Brandow38
and found that the defendant's false statement was not punishable under the statute. 37 The panel identified three aspects of a
false statement to be considered in a section 1001 prosecution:
the nature of the statement;38 the effect of the statement on the
government in general;39 and the effect of the statement on the
§ 1001 if it relates to a matter as to which the Department had the power to act." Ogden,
303 F.2d at 743. In Brandow, the false statement concerned a matter within the jurisdiction of the IRS agents, because under 26 U.S.C. § 3654 (c)(l939) the agents were authorized to "see that all laws and regulations relating to the collection of internal revenue
taxes are faithfully executed and complied with .... " 268 F.2d at 564. Moreover, the
agents were authorized ~ "aid in the prevention, detection, and punishment of any
frauds in relation thereto." Id.
33. The panel stated that because § 1001 is "highly penal" it must be construed as
applicable only to material statements, that is false "statements that could affect or inftuence the exercise of a governmental function." 268 F.2d at 565 (quoting Freidus v.
United States, 223 F.2d 598, SOl (D.C. Cir. 1955». The panel found Brandow's statement
to be "material" because it was calculated to induce agency action or reliance. 268 F.2d
at 565.
34. 455 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1972).
35. Id. at 1110. The defendant made a false affirmative oral statement. When an
FBI agent went to his home to serve him with a subpoena, Bedore told the agent that his
name was "Tom Halstead" and that Bedore was not there. Id.
36. Id. The court noted that it was not concerned with those portions of § 1001 that
penalize the use of false, fraudulent or fictitious writings. Id. at 1110 n.l. Because Brandow involved false written statements in an affidavit, the panel stated that it did not find
the decision helpful. Id.
37. Id. at 1UO. The court stated that § 1001 could not be read literally:
If ... section 1001 were read literally, virtually any false statement, sworn or unsworn, written or oral, made to a Government employee could be penalized as a felony. Thus read, section 1001 would swallow up perjury statutes and a plethora of
other federal statutes proscribing the making of false representations in respect of specific agencies and activities of Government. Extension of section 1001 to its literal breadth, however, cannot be justified by its legislative history.
Id. It concluded that Bedore's statement was not the kind of statement intended to be
covered by § 1101. Id.
38. The panel considered whether the false statement was oral or written, sworn or
unsworn, requested or volunteered. Id. at UU.
39. The panel considered whether the statement was related to a claim upon or
against the government which could relate to property or pecuniary loss to the United
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functions of the particular agency involved!O The panel concluded that oral, unsworn false statements given in response to
questions initiated by the government and which failed to relate
to a claim upon or against' the government were not punishable
under section 1001, unless they "substantially impaired" the
functions entrusted by law to the agency involved.41
Subsequent to Bedore, in United State v. Ratner,42 the circuit limited Bedore's "substantial impairment" test for the materiality of a false statement to situations where a law enforcement agent, such as an FBI agent, was involved. 43 In United
States v. Gold/ine,44 the panel held that when the declarant
makes a false statement to a regulatory agent, such as an IRS
agent, the Brandow "intrinsic ability" test applies!6 Similarly,
in United States v. Carrier,48 the panel ruled that when the declarant falsely replies to an inquiry by an administrative agent,
such as a customs agent, the "intrinsic ability" test controls.47
States. [d.
40. The panel decided that statements like the one made by Bedore would not fall
within the scope of § 1001 unless they "substantially impaired" the functions entrusted
by law to the agency involved. [d. Typical of the kind of false statements which could be
held to substantially impair the investigative functions of the agency involved are "false
reports of crime made to federal law enforcement agencies that may engender groundless
federal investigation." [d.
41. [d.
42. United States v. Ratner, 464 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1972) (where the panel found
that Bedore was a "policeman case" which only controlled in the "exculpatory no"
situation).
43. [d. at 105.
44. 538 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976).
45. Goldfine was a DEA case. The statement was made by a registered pharmacist
during the course of an inspection conducted by the regulatory agency charged with the
duty of investigating the manner in which the pharmacist was complying with the requirements imposed upon him by law. Applying the ','intrinsic impairment" test, the
court held his statement to be covered by § 1001. The majority distinguished this situation from that in Bedore, where the declarant's statement was unrelated to any claim of
privilege from the United States. [d. at 821.
46. 654 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1981).
47. Carrier was a Customs case, where the panel followed Goldfine in using Brandow's "intrinsic impairment" test. [d. at 561. The panel stated (1) that the declarant was
claiming the privilege of entry into the United States and that that alone was enough to
take the case outside of the Bedore decision; and (2) that the defendant's false "no"
answer to any inquiry by customs could very well affect the exercise of governmental
functions and agency decisions since it would have a tendency to prevent Customs from
fulfilling their administrative duty to require persons entering the United States to file a
currency reporting form in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1001. 654 F.2d at 561-62.
The rationale behind the choice of tests was that in all but the pure law enforcement
'cases, the declarant's false statement related to a claim upon or against the government
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Subsequent to Bedore, the Ninth Circuit also began to follow
the strict rule that section 1001 covers false affirmative statements.·8 In United States v. Moore,49 where the declarant made
an affirmative false statement to an administrative agent, the
circuit held that any false statements made in response to a government agent's inquiry can form the basis of a section 1001
conviction. lIo
4.

Other Circuits:

The other circuits are divided on the issue of the scope of
section 1001. 111 Three categories of decisions may be discerned.
The majority of circuit's construe the statute narrowly and
find some exception to the application of section 1oo1.5l1 The
Fifth Circuit, for example, recognizes a clearly defined "exculpatory no" exception to the statute. 5S An "exculpatory no" is a
false denial of involvement in criminal activity given in response
to questions initiated by a government investigator. 54 An "exculpatory no" must satisfy four requirements in order to be considered outside the scope of section 1011:&5 the false "no" must not
and thus affected the concerns which led to the passage of § 1001. In the law enforcement situation described in Bedore, where the statement did not relate to a claim upon
or against the government, the statement had to have a greater impact on the functions
of the agency involved before it was considered punishable under § 1001. See Goldfine,
538 F.2d at 826 (Ferguson, D.J. dissenting).
48. The majority in Duncan also followed this rule. See infra notes 88-90 & accompanying text. But see, Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109 (where the defendant's false affirmative
statement was not found to be within the scope of § 1(01).
49. 638 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1980».
50. Moore was a Customs case where the defendant volunteered a false affirmative
statement to Customs agents. The panel held that any affirmative statement in response
to a Customs agent's inquiry can form the basis of a § 1001 conviction. [d. at 1175.
51. For a full discussion of this issue, see H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sese.
171, 179-180 (1980).
52. See generally United States v. Erhardt, 381 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1967) (where the
court found that section 1001 was not meant to cover false statements that might infiuence the outcome of a judicial proceeding); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924 (7th
Cir. 1960) (where the court excluded involuntary statements from the scope of § 1(01);
Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118 (1Oth Cir. 1960)(where the court held that only
material statements may be prosecuted under section 1(01), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 878
(1965); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967) (where the court found
that no statements made to the FBI meet the jurisdictional requirement of § 1(01).
53. See generally United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d'1208 (5th Cir. 1978); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d
298 (5th Cir. 1962).
54. Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 305, 309.
55. [d.
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relate to any claim on the declarant's behalf against the United
States;1I6 the "no" answer must not relate to the privilege of obtaining or retaining government employment;1I7 the circumstances surrounding the false "no" answer must have involved a
definite possibility of self-incrimination;1I8 and the false statement must have been sought aggressively by the government investigator. 1I9 The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the nature of the
statement, not the type of agency involved, determines the applicability of the exculpatory no exception. 6o Even false statements made to Customs, IRS, or DEA agents are covered by the
exception, so long as the statements meet the necessary
requirements. 81
The Second Circuit is representative of those circuits which
broadly construe section 1001.82 In United States u. Adler,8s
where the declarant lied to an FBI agent,84 the Second Circuit
refused to exclude law enforcement agencies from the scope of
section 1001.611 The panel stated that neither the legislative history nor recent decisions suggest that Congress intended investi56.
57.
58.
59.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
60. The panel in Paternostro stated:
It is our feeling that the "exculpatorty no" answer without any
affirmative, aggressive or overt misstatement on the part of
the defendant does not come within the scope of the statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1001. Whether the Government agent to whom the
answer is given be an agent of the F.B.I., a "policeman", or an
, Internal Revenue agent, is of little consequence. The same
rule should apply to all "policemen", and therefore, we cannot
approve one rule for one type of agent and another rule for an
agent of another department of the same Government.
311 F.2d at 309. See also Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (where the court found that a
false no answer made in response to an inquiry initiated by customs respecting unreported currency was within the "exculpatory no" exception because the declarant believed that saying more than no would be incriminating).
61. Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 309.
62. The Ninth Circuit is included in this category.
63. 380 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1967).
64. [d. at 922.
65. [d. The panel stated that it did not believe that making § 1001 applicable to
false statements given to the FBI would deter individuals acting in good faith from voluntarily giving information or making complaints to the FBI. [d. The panel noted that it
would not find an exception of the statute just because the penalty for a violation of
§ 1001 might exceed the penalty for perjury. The matter of penalties is within the discretion of Congress. [d.
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gative agencies to be denied the protection of section 1001.66
The First Circuit adopted a unique approach to section
1001. In United States v. Poutre,67 where the declarant lied to
an IRS agent, the court declined to rule on the precise scope of
section 1001. 68 The court stated that although it was possible to
justify the judicial engrafting of an exception to the statute,6' it
preferred to wait for "legislative therapy" for section 1001.70
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING

The Majority
The majority in Duncan dealt with three issues raised by
the defendant regarding the applicability of section 1001 to his
false statement: (1) whether the existence of the narrower, more
specific, currency reporting statute, 31 U.S.C. section 5316,
which also prohibited his false statement, precluded the application of section 1001; (2) whether the false statement was "material" within the meaning of section 1001; and (3) whether the
. false statement came within the "exculpatory no" exception to
section 1001. 71
The majority refuted the defendant's contention with respect to the first issue, stating that there was no reason the defendant could not be charged and convicted under section 1001
simply because another statute was also applicable. 72 The panel
observed that criminal conduct often entails the violation of
66. [d.

67. 646 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980). Poutre involved false statements made to an IRS
agent which were contrary to prior sworn statements.
68. [d. at 686.
69. [d. The panel acknowledged that an exception to § 1001 could be justified by the
rationale that, if literally construed, § 1001 would swallow up perjury statutes. But the
panel declined to adopt an arbitrary court·drawn line between affirmative and exculpatory negative responses given to government investigators during criminal investigations.
[d.

70. The panel stated that there was an increasing liklihood of "legislative therapy of
§ 1001 as the revision of Title 18 of the United States Code inches closer to final resolution." [d.

71. 693 F.2d at 975. The defendant had argued that the narrower and more specific
currency reporting statutes, 31 U.S.C. § 1001, and 31 U.S.C. § 1058 (1983), which provides, "whoever willfully violates any provision of this chapter or any regulation under
this chapter shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both", precluded the arplication of § 1001 to his false statement. 693 F.2d at 975.
72, [d.
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more than one statute, and if the several statutes contain different elements, the prosecutor can charge the defendant with violating any or all of the statutes. 73 Further, the judge can convict
the defendant of violating one or more of the statutes. 74 Accordingly' the majority concluded that since the elements of section
1001 and 5316 are different, the government properly charged
the defendant with violating section 1001, despite the existence
of the narrower, more specific currency statute. 711
Turning to the second issue, the majority disagreed with the
defendant's contention that his false statement was not material
within the meaning of section 1001.78 The majority stated that
the rule in the Ninth Circuit, as articulated in Goldfine," is that
a statement satisfies the materiality requirement if it could have
affected or influenced the exercise of a governmental function. 78
The majority pointed out that the court has followed this rule in
prior customs decisions. 79 For example, in Carrier,80 the Ninth
Circuit found the defendant's false statement to be material
since it had the natural tendency to prevent the customs agents
. from fulfilling their administrative duty to require persons to file
currency reporting forms. 81 The majority conceded that Carrier's factual situation was different from Duncan's - Carrier
was entering the country while Duncan was leavings! - yet the
majority deemed this difference as insignificant. 83 In both cases
Customs had a duty to enforce reporting laws, and in both instances a false answer could impair Customs' ability to func73. Id. (citing United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978) (where the panel
impliedly held that if the counts are not redundant, that is if the statutes violated have
different elements, then the defendant may be charged and convicted of violating one or
more statutes».
74. 693 F.2d at 975.
75. Id. (relying on Moore, 638 F.2d 1171 (where the defendant was convicted of violating both §§ 1101 and 1001)).
76. 693 F.2d at 975.
77. 538 F.2d 815.
78. 693 F.2d at 975.
79. Id.
80. 654 F.2d 559.
81. Id. at 561-62.
82. 693 F.2d at 976.
83. Id. Note that the panel in Carrier found the fact that the defendant was entering the country to be very significant. The panel stated, "[hlere, the appellant was claiming the privilege of entry into the United States. This alone is enough to take this case
outside of the Bedore decision." 654 F.2d at 561.
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tion. 84 Therefore, the majority found that Duncan's false statement was material within the meaning of section 1001.811
With regard to the "exculpatory no" issue, the majority rejected Duncan's contention that his statement fell within the
"exculpatory no" exception. 88 First, the majority questioned the
validity of the "exculpatory no" exception within the Ninth Circuit. 87 Second, the majority explained that since Duncan made a
false affirmative statement, the statement does not come within
the exception88 under Ninth Circuit precedent. The majority
stated that the Ninth Circuit follows the rule enunciated in
Moore,89 that any affirmative false statement in response to a
Customs agent's inquiry can form the basis of a section 1001
conviction. 90 Since Duncan did more than merely say no, the
majority concluded that the statements were sufficient to form
the basis of a section 1001 conviction. 91

The Dissent
In dissent, Judge Fletcher argued that section 1001 did not
apply to the defendant's false statement. 92 The dissent began its
discussion by comparing the situation in Duncan to that in
Bedore. 9s The dissent maintained that the defendant's false
statement was similar to Bedore's in terms of materiality, moral
culpability, and potential for misleading governmental officials."
Neither statement related to a claim of privilege from the
United States or to a claim against the government.91i Both were
oral, unsworn responses to inquiries by government investigators.98 Due to the· strong similarities. between the statements, the
dissent argued that the majority should have followed the
84. 693 F.2d at 976.

85.Id.
86.Id.
87. Id. (citing Moore, 638 F.2d 1171).
88. 693 F.2d at 976.
89. 638 F.2d 1171.
90. 693 F.2d at 976.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 984. Judge Fletcher's dissent characterized the § 1001 issue to be,
"whether 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was ever intended by Congress to apply to the appellant'8
false statement in the first place." Id. at 985.
93.Id.
94.Id.
95.Id.
96.Id.
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Bedore approach to determine whether a false statement falls
within the scope of section 1001. 97
In making her determination, Judge Fletcher scrutinized
the structure of the Currency Reporting Act and found that
Congress did not intend for section 1001 to apply to false statements regarding unreported currency.98 Rather, such statements
were meant to be penalized under the Currency Act. 99 The dissent explained that the Currency Reporting Act is divided into
two parts: Section 1101 sets out the reporting requirements,l°o
while section 1058 contains the sanctions for violation of the requirements. 101 The dissent argued that if Congress had intended
section 1001 to apply to persons who violated section 5316, it
would not have enacted a statute containing separate and specific penalties for the violations. 102
Additionally, the dissent pointed out that the statutory situation in Duncan is different from that in Gilliland,103 where the
Supreme Court held that section 1001 applied to written violations of the Hot Oil Act, even though the Act carried its own
lesser- penalty!04 The dissent distinguished the two cases on the
97. Judge Fletcher stated:
Plainly, the statement used to convict Duncan in this case did
not threaten to "substantially impair the basic functions entrusted by law" to the Customs Service. The Customs Service
did not rely in any way upon the contents of the statements in
question .... Rather, Duncan's statements were elicited in
response to formal questions preceding a search that the
agents evidently intended to perform no matter what the
response.
[d. at 985.
98. [d.
99. Judge Fletcher observed:
The only conceivable, but basically implausible, reason why
Congress might have created the lesser penalty and still intended some play for section 1001, would be that Congress intended to distinguish between a simple failure to report and a
currency reporting violation that is accomplished by affirmative misrepresentations, allowing punishment of the latter
much more harshly than a 'mere' failure to report. This hypothesis finds no support in the legislative history,. however.
[d. at 985-86.
100. See supra note 9 for text of § 1001.
101. See supra note 72 for text of § 1058.
102. 693 F.2d at 985.
103. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
104. 693 F.2d at 986-87 (citing Gilliland, supra note 22).
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basis of section 1001's legislative history, which makes clear that
section 1001 was meant to apply the Hot Oil Act violations, but
does not indicate that section 1001 was intended as a sanction
for currency reporting violations. 1011
The dissent concluded that section 1001 should be interpreted narrowly.l08 It should not be used as a sanction against
conduct already proscribed, unless the expansion is supported
by legislative history. Since there is nothing in the legislative
history to show that Congress intended section 1001 to cover the
Duncan situation, the dissent determined that the defendant's
false statements were outside the scope of section 1001.107

D.

CRITIQUE

In Duncan, the Ninth Circuit departed from previous case
law regarding the application of section 1001 to false statements
made during criminal investigations. The majority held that the
sole question for determining the materiality of a false statement is whether the statement could have affected or influenced
a governmental function. l08 The Circuit considered unimportant
the nature of the statement and the statement's relation to a
claim upon or against the United States,l°9
The Ninth Circuit's present approach to section 1001 is unsupported by the statute's legislative history. The original intent
of the false statements statute was to prevent pecuniary or property loss to the government resulting from false statements and
related false claims made upon or against the United States. no
Yet, in Duncan, the panel found "insignificant" the fact that the
defendant's false statement failed to relate to a claim upon or
against the United States.1ll The 1934 amendment indicated
that Congress also intended the statute to protect the regulatory
schemes of government from the perversion or frustration which
105. The dissent also noted that the cases can be distinguished on the grounds that
in Gilliland the false statement was written, while in Duncan the statement was oral.
693 F.2d at 986-87.
106. [d. at 987.
107. [d.
108. See supra notes 76-78 & accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 82-83 & accompanying text.
110. See supra note 17 & accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 82-83 & accompanying text.
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might result from deceptive practices.1l2 Yet the panel in
Duncan considered of no import the fact that the government
agents were investigators and that the defendant's false statement did not impair the agents' ability to continue their
investigation. us
Here, the defendant's false statement should not have been
considered punishable under section 1001. The false statement
was ·made during a nonspecific criminal investigation initiated
by special Customs agents. The statement was not unrelated either to a claim of privilege from the government or to a claim
against the government, and did not substantially impair the investigative functions of the agents involved.
As soon as the agents noticed the defendant at the departure gate at the Los Angeles International Airport, they began a
criminal investigation based on the fact that he was traveling
alone, not talking to anyone and appeared to be looking for
someone. The agents used the currency declaration requirements
of section 1101 to create a situation in which to question and
search the defendant. That is, the agents were not engaged in
fulfilling an administrative duty of requiring persons who leave
the United States to file a currency reporting form in accordance
with section 1101. Rather, the agents focused on the currency
statute solely to generate an opportunity to conduct a criminal
investigation, interrogation, and search of the defendant.
The defendant's false statement did not interfere with the
investigative functions of the customs agents. The statement did
not change the outcome of the investigation. It did not affect the
agents' right to continue their investigation, nor did it change
their ability to act on information received from the defendant.
The statement was not a voluntarily given falsehood intended to
provoke agency action, nor did it send the agents on a groundless investigation. Rather, the defendant's statement was elicited
in response to formal questions preceding a search t~at the
agents intended to perform regardless of the response.
The panel should have followed the Bedore approach to the
112. See supra notes 20 & accompanying text.
.
113. 693 F.2d at 985.
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application of section 1001 to false statements made during
criminal investigations. Under Bedore's 'substantial impairment" test, the defendant's false statement would not have been
considered sufficient to form the basis of a section 1001 conviction. The defendant's false statement, similar to that of the defendant in Bedore, was an oral, unsworn, response to questions
initiated by government agents. Since the defendant was not entering the country, the statement failed to relate to a claim
against the government of the privilege of entry. Further, since
the agents apparently intended to continue their investigation of
the defendant regardless of his response to their questions, his
false statement did not substantially impair their investigative
function. Accordingly, the defendant's false statement should
not have been found punishable under section 1001. Congress
did not intend the defendant's statement to fall within the scope
of the stat~te. The statement did not implicate any of the original concerns which led· to the passage of section 1001, to wit, it
failed to relate to a claim upon ·or against the United States and
did not frustrate the functions of the agents involved.

E.

CONCLUSION

Under the Duncan holding, virtually any false statement
made to a government agent is considered to be within the scope
of the statute. Mere denials of involvement in criminal activity
made to investigative agents which would not result in pecuniary
or property loss to the United States and which do not threaten
to impair the functions of the agency involved are punishable by
a $10,000 fine or a five-year prison term. The Ninth Circuit's
approach is unreasonably severe in light of the statute's objective and will continue to result in unwarranted convictions and
unfair punishments.

Louise Pierce Sabella·

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1984.
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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS: IMBALANCE IN THE LAW?

A.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz/ the Ninth Circuit
held that the owner of an automobile loaned to another had no
constitutional right to protes~ an unlawful search of that vehicle. I The court found that the owner did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the automobile solely on the basis
of ownership. 8
On the evening of April 2, 1982, claimant Aimee Webb'
loaned her 1977 Mercedes Benz to Thomas Reese. 4 While operating the vehicle, Reese was stopped by two Los Angeles police
officers investigating the absence of license plates on the vehicle. 6 After Reese was. out of the vehicle, an unlawful search of
the latter uncovered a package containing cocaine.6 Reese was
arrested,7but in the ensuing State prosecution, the evidence was
. suppressed as unlawfully seized, and the charges against him
were dismissed. 8
Upon arriving at the scene, Webb told the officers that she
owned the car and that Reese had permission to use it. Webb
denied having any knowledge of the narcotics in the Mercedes,'
and the officers then released the car to her.lO
On the following day, however, Los Angeles police seized the
Mercedes. l l The police later released the vehicle to the Drug Enforcement Agency/I which initiated forfeiture proceedings
against Webb. l8 The governD;lent was granted summary judg1. 708 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Boochever, C.J.; the other panel members were
Wright, and Kennedy, JJ.).
2. Id. at 449.
3. Id. at 449-50.
4. Id. at 446.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8. Id. at 447 n.2.
9. Id. at 446.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13. Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 511(c), 21 U.S.C. §
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ment. 14 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit court, Webb contended la
that the evidence unlawfully seized should be excluded from the
forfeiture proceeding.
B.

BACKGROUND

1. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy

Since Mapp v. Ohio,16 where the Supreme Court extended
application of the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions, the
Court has attempted to define the scope of the rule's application. 17 The Court, in defining the extent of the fourth amendment in the landmark decision Katz v. United States,18 determined that the fourth amendment protects people, not places. 19
In excluding the evidence obtained through the government's
use of an electronic listening device which monitored petitioner's
telephone conversation, the Court noted that the proper focus in
a fourth amendment inquiry is the privacy expectation of the
individual rather than his or her property rights. 20
In Alderman v. United States,21 where petitioner urged
suppression of evidence obtained through unlawful government
eavesdropping of numerous telephone conversations, the Court
held that the fourth amendment was a personal right which
could not be vicariously asserted. 22 Petitioner, who was neither a
participant in the monitored conversations nor the owner of the
premises where the conversations occurred, had no "standing" to
881(d) (1976) & (Supp. V. 1981), allows the initiation of forfeiture proceedings when the
government has shown probable cause sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the
vehicle was used to transport contraband. 708 F.2d at 446, 447.
14. ld. at 446.
15.ld.
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
18. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
19. ld. at 351.
20. ld. at 351-352. In Katz the Court found that any evidence as to whether the
government had physically trespassed while monitoring petitioner's phone conversation
was irrelevant. !d. at 352. The significant factor was that Katz went into the public
phone booth and shut the door, thereby expressing his intention to keep his telephone
conversation from the "uninvited ear." ld. at 352.
21. 394 U.S. 165 (1968).
22. ld. at 171-175.
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object to the government's unlawful activity. 23
In Rakas v. Illinois,24 where petitioner protested the search
of an automobile in which he was a passenger, the Court held
that the proper inquiry to determine whether an individual had
experienced a fourth amendment violation 211 was whether that
person had a "legitimate expectation of privacy"26 in the thing
or area searched. 27 The Rakas court stated that although property interests alone are insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy,28 the Supreme Court had not altogether
abandoned the use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of privacy interests protected by the fourth
amendment. 29
The Court later in Rawlings v. Kentucky,30 described the
23. [d. In reaching its decision not to extend application of the exclusionary rule
other than to those whose personal fourth amendment rights were violated, the Court
employed a balancing test. [d. at 174. The Court considered the deterrence aim of the
exclusionary rule to be a major factor in this balancing test. [d. The Court, however, felt
that the additional benefits of extending the rule did not justify "further encroachment
upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." [d. at 175. The
court thus distinguished those who had personally experienced an unconstitutional
search or seizure and then had evidence obtained as a result of this act used against
them at trial from those who had this same evidence used against them at trial, but who
had not personally experienced an unconstitutional search or seizure. [d. For "constitutional purposes" the Court found a "substantial difference" between these two cases. [d.
at 174. Finally, the Court noted that the exclusionary rule was judicially created and left
it up to the legislative branch to expand fourth amendment protection. [d. at 175.
24. 439 U.S. 128.
25. The inquiry regarding whether a party may assert a fourth amendment violation
in the past has been addressed under the rubric of "standing." However, "standing" is
now to be subsumed within the larger question of whether petitioner's fourth amendment rights have been violated. [d. at 139.
26. [d. at 143. The phrase "legitimate expectation of privacy" is taken from Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.''' Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 ..
27. Rokas, 439 U.S. at 143.
28. [d. at 143 n.12.
29. [d. In Rokas, the court discussed their decision in Alderman as an example of
the role property concepts should play in any legitimate expectation of privacy determination. In Alderman the Court noted that an individual's property interest in his home
was so great as to allow him to object to electronic surveillance of conversations emanating from his home, even though he himself was not a party to the conversation. [d.; See
394 U.S. at 176.
30. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
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Rakas analysis as a totality of the circumstances test,3} in which
a number of factors were to be considered32 such as ownership,
the right to exclude others, and the relationship between the
owner and the person in possession of the object searched. 33 In
Rawlings, the police illegally searched the purse of the defendant's companion, finding drugs allegedly belonging to the defendant. Applying the "totality of the circumstances", the Court
found that the defendant Rawlings had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his friend's purse, and therefore had no standing to contest the illegal search. 34
Finally, in United States v. Salvucci,3/) where petitioners
were indicted for unlawful possession of stolen mail, the Court
found that while property rights were a factor to be considered,
ownership of the property was not determinative. 36 Rather than
an analysis based on traditional property concepts, the Court
found the more pertinent inquiry to be the right to exclude
others and any precautions taken to maintain a privacy
interest. 37

2. Diminished Expectation of Privacy in the Automobile
In Cady v. Dumbroski,38 the Supreme Court held that
automobiles are considered "effects" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, and therefore protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 3s However, in Chambers v. Maroney,.o the
Court held that a different, lesser, standard of "reasonableness"
should apply to automobile searches than used in a home or office. 41 The automobile's inherent mobility created circumstances
31. [d. at 104.
32. [d. at 105.
33. [d at 104·106.
34. [d.
35. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
36. [d. at 91.
37. [d.
38. Cady v. Dumbroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). The fourth amendment provides: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." [d. at 439. The Court's classification of
automobiles as "effects" requires that a government search of an automobile, without
consent, is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.
39. [d.
40. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
41. [d. at 48 (citing Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 152-155 (1925». See also
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of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, made vigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement impossible. 42 The court
concluded that because automobiles and similar objects43 were
mobile, a different treatment was warranted. 44
Along with this element of inherent mobility, the Court also
pointed out, in South Dakota u. OpP!!rman,4& that the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly
less than the expectation in one's home or office. 48 In Cardwell u.
Lewis,4? the Court explained that there is a lesser expectation of
privacy in the automobile because it functions mainly as transportation, and it rarely serves as one's residence or as a reposi'tory of personal effects.48 Furthermore, it is driven on public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view. 49
The Court additionally has pointed to other factors which
reduce an automobile's privacy. States require all drivers to be
licensed, &0 and both states and localities enact detailed codes
regulating ownership and operation of vehicles. &1 Furthermore,
law enforcement officials are brought into more frequent contact
with automobiles than with homes or other geographically fixed
areas. &2 Automobiles, unlike homes, also must undergo periodic
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-367 (1964).
42. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
43. In Carrol the Court noted that ships, motorboats, and wagons would be treated
similarly. 267 U.S. at 152-155.
44. [d. The basic reason for the different treatment stems from the opportunity to
move the object out of the locality or jurisdiction in which a warrant must be sought. [d.
at 153. See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
45. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman, the Court upheld an inventory search of
petitioner's car after it had been impounded for multiple parking violations. The police
found a bag of marijuana which petitioner unsuccessfully attempted to suppress. [d. at
366.
46. [d. at 367.
47. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). In Lewis, the Court upheld a warrantless search of petitioner's automobile while petitioner was in custody and while the automobile was in a
public parking lot. [d. at 590.
48. [d.
49. [d.

50. Cady v. Dumbroski, 413 U.S. at 368.
51. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367-368.
52. [d. In a footnote the Court notes that two of its decisions, Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) required a
warrant to effect an administrative entry into and inspection of private dwellings or commercial premises to ascertain health or safety violations. 428 U.S. 364, 367 n.2 In con-
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official inspection and are often taken into police custody in the
interests of public safety. 53 These factors, taken together, according to the Court in Cardwell v. Lewis,54 justified the application of a less stringent warrant requirement to automobiles. 55
3.

Circuit Court Application

In a prosecution for conspiracy to smuggle marijuana, the
Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Dyar,56 that no legitimate
expectation of privacyll7 in a searched airplane exists solely on
the basis of ownership. 58 The Dyar Court noted that even if petitioner could show an ownership interest sufficient to satisfy
"traditional property concepts" in order to establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy he must also demonstrate a cognizable
privacy interest in the place searched or the thing seized. 59 Applying the reasoning in Dyar, the Fourth,60 Eighth,6l Ninth,SI
trast, this procedure has never been held applicable to automobile inspections for safety
purposes. [d. at 367-68.
53. [d.

54. See Carrol, 267 U.S. 132.
55. 417 U.S. at 590.
56. 574 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978).
57. Prior to Rakas, the Fifth Circuit had adopted the legitimate expectation of privacy language from Katz as the proper test to determine whether petitioner had experienced a fourth amendment violation. United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir.
1976). See also United States v. Mendoza, 500 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
McConnell, 500 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1971); United States v.
Hunt, 505 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975).
58. United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d at 1385.
59. [d. at 1390. The Dyar court found that any personal privacy interest that petitioner had through his ownership was abandoned when he gave possession over to another. [d. Post Rakas decisions by the Fifth Circuit have reaffirmed the Dyar holding.
See United States v. Vicknair, 610 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823
(1981); United States v. Meyer, 656 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dunn, 674
F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1982).
60. In United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149 (4th Cir. 1980) (where petitioner
was protesting a warrantless search of his "junker" car) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030
(1981), the Fourth Circuit noted that ownership alone is not enough to establish a Rakas
legitimate expectation of privacy. [d. at 1154-1155. Rather, the Rakas inquiry was determined by a totality of the circumstances. See also United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d
411, 412-413 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dickerson, 655 F.2d 559, 561 (4th Cir.
1981); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1339-1340 (4th Cir. 1981).
61. In United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1978) (where petitioner was
found to have legitimate expectation of privacy in a mailed package), the Eight Circuit
pointed out that a bare assertion of a property interest without a supporting expectation
of privacy would not give rise to a cognizable fourth amendment claim. [d. at 1369. But
see United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.3 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S.
847 (1979).
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TenthS8 and EleventhS4 Circuits similarly have held ownership
alone as insufficient to establish a privacy interest.
In United States v. Heydel,sr. where petitioner was found to
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his parent's home,
the Fifth, Circuit stated that no one circumstance was "talismanic" to the Rakas inquiry.ss Rather, the determination as to
whether petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the Rakas legitimate expectation of privacy was to be made from the totality
of the circumstances of the case. S7 Factors the Fifth Circuit considered other than ownership are: petitioner's possessory interest
in the place searched or thing seized, the right to exclude others,
prior use of the area searched or property seized, legitimate
presence in the area searched and a subjective expectation of
privacy.ss
In United States

v.

Dall,sD where petitioner protested the

62. In United States v. Medina·Verdugo, 637 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1979) (where petitioner was contesting the search of a friend's purse), the Ninth Circuit noted that ownership is but one factor to be considered when determining an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 652. See also United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. One 56 Foot Yacht Named Tahuma, 702 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.
1983).
63. In United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
918 (1981), the Tenth Circuit held that petitioner's bare legal ownership of a mobile
home was insufficient to create a Rakas legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 1345.
See also United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 759 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 882 (1980), United States v. $3,799.00 in United States Currency, 684 F.2d 674, 678
(10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1440-1441 (1Oth Cir. 1983).
64. In United States Friere, 710 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1983) (where petitioner was
found to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his briefcase), the Eleventh Circuit
noted that "mere ownership was not the talisman for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 1519. However, the court went on to say "it is a bright star by which
courts are guided when the place invaded enjoys universal acceptance as a haven of privacy, such as one's home." Id.; See also United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 352
(11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S.C. 354 (1982); United States v. Tones, 705, F.2d 1287, 1293-1294 (11th Cir. 1983).
65. 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
66. Id. at 1154-1155.
67.Id.
68. Id. at 1154-1155. For other circuits' enunciations of these factors see United
States v. Locham, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d
47, 64 (2nd Cir. 1980); United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d at 1155-1156; United
States v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498, 1505 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d at
1335; United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1440-1441; United States v. Friere, 710 F.2d at
1518-1519.
69. 608 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980).

v.
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search of the locked camper cap on his pickup truck, the First
Circuit held that mere ownership of the pickup truck was insufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy.70 In Dall,
the court pointed out that petitioner's ownership claim was
weakened by the diminished expectation of privacy surrounding
the automobile,71 and reasoned that this claim was more attenuated since petitioner relinquished possession of the truck.71
Therefore, while ownership alone would not have been determinative, the attenuation surrounding petitioner's ownership claim
contributed to defeat petitioner's claim of a Rakas legitimate expectation of privacy.73
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING

In One 1977 Mercedes Benz, the court focused on petitoner's fourth amendment assertions: 7• Did Webb, the owner
of the Mercedes suffer a fourth amendment intrusion7l1 when the
automobile was unlawfully7s searched while in another's
possession ?"
The court, in applying the Rakas test, inquired· as to
whether the unlawful search of Webb's automobile violated any
legitimate expectation of privacy she may have had in the Mer. cedes while it was loaned to Reese. 78
70. ld. at 914.
71. ld. at 914-915.
72. ld. at 915.
73. ld. Subsequent First Circuit decisions have reaffirmed Dall. In United States v.
Smith, 621 F.2d 483 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. lO86 (1980), the Second Circuit
found that petitioners did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the trunk of
an automobile that they were driving. ld. at 486-488. While applying the Rakas test, the
Smith court pointed out that an individual's expectation of privacy in an automobile was
significantly lower than his expectation of privacy in a residence. ld.
74. Petitoner Webb also raised a number of other issues in her appeal. She contended that forfeiture of her Mercedes was improper because it was not properly seized
by either the state or the federal authorities. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d at 450.
In conjunction with her unlawful seizure assertions, Webb also raised a jurisdictional
issue.ld. Citing Ninth Circuit precedent, the court refused to decide the merits of these
claims because they became irrelevant in light of the court's ruling that Webb had suffered no personal fourth amendment violation. ld. Therefore, the sole issue decided by
the court was whether Webb had suffered a personal fourth amendment violation. ld.
75. ld. at 448 n.3. See also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139.
76. ld. at 449-450.
77. ld. at 448.
78.ld.
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The court observed that the Supreme Court has found
automobiles to be surrounded by a diminished expectation of
privacy.78 The court, citing Cardwell v. Lewis,80 noted that because a major function of an automobile is transportation, it
does not carry the same expectation of privacy that a house or
other fixed objects would. 8} Additionally, the court relying on
South Dakota v. Opperman,82 noted that due to the numerous
regulatory laws concerning automobiles, police officers may justifiably intrude further with regard to automobiles than with regard to houses. 88 Relying on these and other decisions,84 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the automobile is surrounded by a
diminished expectation of privacy.8&
Next, the court examined Supreme Court decisions relating
to whether ownership alone would confer to petitioner Webb a
Rakas legitimate expectation of privacy.88 The court pointed out
tha~ in Salvucci and Rawlings property ownership, although not
determinative, was found to be a relevant factor in creating a
legitimate expectation of privacy.87 While under Rakas, expectations of privacy may be legitimized by references to real or personal property concepts,88 the court found that the strength of
any of these arguments depended on the circumstances of each
case. as The right to exclude others and efforts taken to protect a
privacy interest, for example, represent circumstances that
would heighten an individual's expectation of privacy.so
The court noted that in Dall, the First Circuit held the petitioner ha~ no legitimate expectation of privacy in a truck which
he loaned to another. S } The court also noted that it was unnecessary to go as far as Dall, since unlike Dall, no locked portions of
79.ld.
SO. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
81. 708 F.2d at 448.
82. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
83. 708 F.2d at 448.
84. Cady v. Dumbroski. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
85. 708 F.2d 448.
86. Id. at 449.
87.ld.
88.ld.
89.ld.
9O.ld.
91. Id.
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the automobile were involved in the search. 92
Similarly, the court noted that in Dyar, the Fifth Circuit
held that although the defendants asserted a leasehold interest
in an airplane sufficient to create a traditional property right,
they had abandoned any expectation of privacy when they gave
possession of the plane to the pilot. 98
The court set forth what it considered the relevant factors
to Webb's claim: Webb voluntarily turned her car over to Reese
for his exclusive use, she did not take any precautions to safeguard any privacy interest she may have had in the Mercedes,
and the police officer intruded only into the passenger compartment where Reese could have invited anyone. 9 • Based on these
factors the court held that Webb waived her expectation of privacy and could not now protest the search of her Mercedes. 911
Recognizing the harshness of their decision, the court
pointed out that Webb was not precluded from other means of
redress, such as a claim for mitigation or a constitutional
objection. ge
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 449-450.
[d. at 451 n.6. The court stated:
[The result of the decision) may seem unduly harsh as applied
to an innocent owner who lends property to another unaware
that it will be used in violation of federal law. As we have seen
that owner may be unable to protest either the unlawful
seizure of the property or the evidence necessary to make a
case for forfeiture.

[d.

The court suggested two potential methods of remedy. [d. First the court pointed to
dicta in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), which suggested a possible constitutional claim by an owner who could. prove not only that he was
uninvolved, but also that he had done all that he reasonably could to prevent the proscribed use of his property. [d. at 689.
The second suggested method of redress suggested by the court concerned procedures for remission and mitigation contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976). See 21 U.S.C. §
881(d) (Supp. V. 1981). Under this provision forfeiture may be remitted or mitigated if
the owner acted without willful negligence or without an intention to violate the law.
The regulations promulgated to implement § 1618 state that, if the property subje.ct to
forfeiture was in the possession of another who was responsible for the violation of law
bringing about the forfeiture, the owner must produce evidence explaining how the property came in the possession of the other party, and showing that, prior to parting With
the property, the owner did not know or have reasonable cause to believe that the prop-
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D. Critique
The Ninth Circuit's application of the Rakas analysis to
Webb's appeal stands on solid precedential ground. This decision, like both the First Circuit's Dall and the Fifth Circuit's
Dyar decisions, is an appropriate application of the Supreme
Court's position as expressed in Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci;
the cases which narrowed and refined traditional "standing"
analysis. This process of refinement was the inevitable result of
the Supreme Court's Alderman decision, where the Court, after
utilizing a balancing test, chose to restrict application of the exclusionary rule to those who personally experienced a fourth
amendment violation.
Like Alderman, the Ninth Circuit classified Webb as one
who was merely aggrieved by the introduction of damaging evidence. As Webb was not directly subjected to unlawful policy
activity, her claims to privacy in her automobile while it was
loaned to another seem rather remote. In her appeal Webb
demonstrated no effort to maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in her Mercedes. No locked portions of the vehicle were
involved over which Webb retained exclusive authority. Given
the diminished expectation of privacy that has traditionally surrounded the automobile, the court's decision denying Webb her
Rakas privacy claim was proper.
While the Ninth Circuit's holding is consistent with both
Dall and Dyar, these decisions can be distinguished from the
principal case in that they both involved petitioners who were
criminal defendants. Webb, who merely lent her car to another,
stands to lose her automobile for an illegal act of which she was
no part. This injustice emanates from the forfeiture statute
which enables the government to use evidence obtained in an
unlawful manner while denying the aggrieved individuals the
right to protest its use. Hence, the Ninth Circuit's decision illustrates the problem of applying fourth amendment law to forfeiture proceedings.
erty would be used in violation of the law or that the violator had a criminal record or a
general reputation for commercial crime. 19 C.F.R. § 171.13(a) (1982).
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The court, recognizing the injustice arising out of forfeiture
of an automobile belonging to someone innocent of criminal
wrongdoing, pointed out in a footnote the alternative means of
redress potentially available to Webb. First, the court mentioned
a possible constitutional claim that had been suggested by the
Supreme Court in dicta. However, both the Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit failed to define this possible claim other than
to suggest its potential existence. Secondly, the court suggested
statutorily prescribed means of redress. However, serious questions remain as to whether Webb would qualify for this remedy
because the statutory procedure may require Webb to show that
prior to lending her car to Reese she did not know that he had a
criminal record. Enforcement of this requirement would in effect
penalize Webb for her association with a person with a criminal
record. Furthermore, even if the court's suggested alternatives
were found available to Webb, the time and expenses she would
incur pursuing them may be prohibitive.
The application of fourth amendment standards to the forfeiture proceeding in the instant case can be faulted on grounds
of both authority and fairness. Unlike the situations involved in
other circuit decisions, the petitioner was neither accused of nor
charged with any unlawful conduct with respect to the events
which resulted in the seizure of her automobile. This result suggests a fundamental unfairness in forfeiture law. After all, if a
court applying the present standard must excuse the apparent
inequity of its holding by suggesting some nebulous alternative
methods of redress, then the law is lacking a desired
equilibrium.
Ansel D. Kinney*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985.
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UNITED STATES V. MORENO: HOMES EXPANDED
UNDER THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE DOCTRINE

A.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Moreno l the Ninth Circuit held that the
knock and announce provisions of 18 U.S.C. §31092 prohibited
officers from forcibly entering an alcove adjacent to the front
door of the defendant's apartment without first knocking and
announcing their purpose at the entrance to the alcove. 8
The defendant resided in a multi-unit apartment building.. ·
A solid front door leading to the interior of the defendant's
apartment was recessed six feet from a common hallway, creating an alcove measuring approximately thirty-six square feet.'
An ornamental wrought iron gate extending to the perimeter of
the entrance to the alcove divided the alcove from the common
hallway.6 The gate remained locked and only residents of the
1. 701 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Ely, and
Conby, JJ.).
2. The statute provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, .
to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority
and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the
warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976).
3. 701 F.2d at 817.
4. Id. at 816. The defendant's apartment was one of seventy-six similar apartments
in the building. Id. The building itself was accessible via two glass-doored main entry
ways situated at either end of the building. Brief for Appellee at 10 n.5, United States v.
Moreno, 701 F.2d 815. These entrances remained locked, and only residents of the building had key access. Id. Although the officers gained entry through one of these main
entrances without complying with 18 U.S.C. § 3109, no contention was made by the defendant that that particular entry by the officers violated the statute. 701 F.2d at 816.
Inside the building, common open-air hallways led to the various apartments. Id. at 815.
The defendant's apartment shared one of these common hallways with two other apartments. Id.
5. 701 F.2d at 816.
6. Id. The ornamental gate extended the width of the entrance, and extended to
within several inches of both the floor and ceiling at the entrance to the alcove. Brief for
Appellee at 11, United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815. It was not possible to enter the
defendant's apartment without passing through the gate. 701 F.2d at 816. The entry-way
to the defendant's apartment was not unique from other apartment entry-ways in the
building. Brief for Appellee at 12, United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815. All apartments
in the building had a similar ornamental iron gate leading t.o an alcove and an inner solid
door.Id.
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defendant's apartment had keys.' Nonresidents gained access to
the alcove only by ringing a buzzer located at the side of the
gate. s Thus, the alcove was exclusively available to residents of
the defendant's apartment. s
Federal and local officers, in executing a search warrant of
the defendant's apartment, arrived at the ornamental iron gate,
and without knocking or giving notice to any occupant of the
apartment, pried the gate open, entered the alcove, and approached the solid door of the apartment. 10 One of the officers
knocked on the solid door, announced that he was a police officer with a search warrant and demanded entry.ll A co-defendant admitted the officers, and the subsequent search uncovered
cocaine, cocaine paraphernalia, and firearms. 12
At trial the defendant sought to suppress the evidence
seized in the search, contending that the officers had violated 18
U.S.C. § 3109 by entering the iron gate without knocking at the
gate and announcing their official purpose. 13 The District Court
admitted the evidence finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove area, and because of
this could not expect 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to protect the area from
official unannounced intrusion.14 The defendant appealed to the
7. 701 F.2d at 816.
8. [d.
9. [d.
10. [d. The officers had previously observed the layout of the entry-way and thus

were aware that visitors gained entry to the apartment by notifying the occupants by
ringing a buzzer near the gate. [d.
U. [d. Testimony at trial indicated that it was always the officers intention to knock
and make an announcement at the inner solid door, rather than at the iron gate. Brief
for Appellee at U n.7, United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815. There was no dispute in
the case that the entry at the solid door complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 701 F.2d at 816
n.l.

12. 701 F.2d at 816.
13. [d.
14. [d. The district court also found that, should 18 U.S.C. § 3109 apply to the alcove area, the officers entry at the gate would have none-the-Iess been lawful. [d. It

found that any attempt to knock and announce at the gate would have been futile because the occupants would have been unable to hear the knocking or announcement. [d.
at 817. The district court also found that the officers' suspicions that easily disposable
contraband was within the apartment would have served as exigent circumstances to
excuse the officers' non-compliance with the statute. [d. at 817-18. On appeal these two
additional findings were refuted by the Ninth Circuit. [d. It found that the officers could
have rang the buzzer located near the gate in order to alert the occupants within the
apartment of their presence, and thus the defendant would have been notified of the
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Ninth Circuit contending, inter alia, that he did in fact have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove area. 111
B.

THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE DOCTRINE

The concept requiring that notice be given before a lawful
forcible entry into one's home has been traced back as far as
biblical times,I6 However, it was not until 1806, in Semayne's
Case,I'1 that the King's Bench first required an official give notice and request admittance before forcing an entry into a citizen's home. IS The rule in Semayne's Case has been adopted by
American courts,19 and acceptance of the rule today is evidenced
by the fact that thirty-three states20 and the federal government U have codified the noticerequirement. 22
officers' presence. [d. at 817. It also found that in the absence of sounds or other indications that contraband was being destroyed within the apartment, the officers' suspicions
that drugs were in the apartment were insufficient to constitute the necessary exigent
circumstances to excUse the officers' non-compliance With 18 U.S.C. § 3109. [d. at 818.
15. [d. at 816.
16. Deuteronomy 24:10. For detailed history of the evolution of the knock and announce doctrine from biblical times to 20th century See N. LAssON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937);
Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139 (1970).
17. 4 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
18. The King's Bench in Semayne's Case stated:
In all cases when the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors
be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him,
or to do execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot
enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of
his coming, and to make request to open the doors .
.. Coke at 92, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195. Although the case has long served American courts as
the leading decision regarding forcible entries by law enforcement officials executing a
criminal warrant, Semayne's Case was actually civil in nature and resulted from a sheriff's refused entry rather than from his forced entry.
19. See United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2nd Cir. 1971); United States v.
Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.
1962); United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1972); Garza-Fuente v. United
States, 400 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Fields, 355 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Carringer, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lopez, 475
F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. McClard, 462 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1972), affirming District Court opinion at 333 F. Supp. 158 (1971); United States v. Tolliver, 665
F.2d 1005 (11th Cir. 1982); Perkins v. United States, 432 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1970), affirming District Court opinion at 286 F.Supp 259 (D.D.C. 1968); United States v. Harris,
435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Keiningham'v. United States, 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
20. For a complete discussion and list of state statutes See Blakey, The Rule of
Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112
U. PA. L., REV. 499 (1964).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
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The federal codification of the rule requires that an officer
executing a search warrant give notice of authority and purpose,
and, be refused admittance before breaking in any window or
door of a house. 2s In applying the federal statute for the first
time, the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Miller,u stressed the importance of protecting the common law
privacy interest which served as a basis for the statute, and
stated that the statute was not to be gIven "grudging
application. "211
Lower courts have applied the Miller decision as the controlling authority when applying 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to cases involving an official unannounced entry into a home. 26 The Miller
decision, however, is limited to unlawful unannounced entries
made into the home and does not address common law excep22. Early American courts, undoubtedly influenced by English Writs of Assistance,
were quick to adopt Semayne's Case. "The act creating the Writs of Assistance granted
the right of forcible entry to a customs official carrying a writ. He could take a constable
or other civil official with him in the daytime to enter and go into my house, shop, cellar,
warehouse or room or other place, and in case of resistance, to break open doors, chests,
trunks and other packages, there to seize and from thence to bring any kind of goods or
merchandise whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed." 13-14 Charles II, c.I1, c. § IV, V;
made applicable to colonies: 7-8 William II, c. 22 § II (1696)." Announcement in Police
Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 145 n. 25 (1970). Note, however, that even these highly oppressive writs were to be executed only after an announcement and demand to enter the
home were made. Thus, as early Americans were drafting the Bill of Rights, although no
mention of a knock and announce requirement was included, with the abolished Writs of
Assistance fresh in their minds, it is clear that they did not intend to lessen protection of
the sanctity of the home by authorizing unannounced official entry, but rather considered the required announcement before official entry into one's home inherent in the
authority to enter itself. Indeed, authorities agree that colonial's opposition to the English Writs of Assistance was so great that it became a major factor in sparking the
American Revolution. See 80 YALE L.J. 139, and N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
23. See supra note 2.
24. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
25. The Miller Court stated:
The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose
before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. Congress
codifying a tradition entrenched in Anglo-American law, had
declared in § 3109 the reverence of the law for the individual's
right of privacy in his house.
[d. at 313.
26. In Miller, which involved interpretation of a District of Columbia statute, the
Court stated: "The validity of the entry to execute the arrest without a warrant must be
tested by criteria identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which deals with
entry to execute a search warrant." [d. at 306. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960).
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tions to the notice requirement. 27
Lower courts have developed three exceptions to the rule.
Courts require no notice where an announcement could endanger officers or others,28 where an announcement would be a useless gesture in light of surrounding circumstances,29 and where
exigent circumstances necessitate an officer's unannounced entry.30 The Supreme Court has ruled that a state statute authorizing an unannounced entry in exigent circumstances was constitutional,31 but has yet to decide on the applicability of any of
the three aforementioned exceptions under 18 U.S.C: § 3109.
Thus, until the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United States
v. Fluker,32 application of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 has remained limited
to situations involving either an unlawful unannounced official
entry into a home or an exception to the notice requirement. 33
27. 357 u.S. 301.
28. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1973).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1973).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Salvador, 505 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974).
31. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
32. 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976).
33. Most courts have uniformly held that once officers comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3109
at the entrance to the premises, no additional notice is required for doors within the
premises. See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.8 at 130-31. Courts have also generally
permitted officers to gain entry to dwellings by ruse, without complying with the notice
requirement. Typcially, courts find that entry by ruse is not an exception to the notice
requirement, but instead, since officers conducting the ruse are typically granted entrance freely by occupants, no rights of the occupants are violated. See Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); United States v. Dohm, 597 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Beale, 445 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484
(8th Cir. 1973). Some courts have also extended the application of the notice requirement to officers' entrance to buildings other than personal dwellings. Note that in these
cases, courts still limit application of the knock and announce rule to the entrance of the
building. See United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964) (states in dicta that
smokehouse located 75 feet from house would be protected by 18 U.S.C. § 3109); United
States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1970) (extending 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to protect a
printing store). But see United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusing to
find that small building near defendant's house was covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3109); Fields
v. United States, 355 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding that a chicken coop was not covered by the notice requirement); United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1982)
(finding that a barbershop was not covered by the notice requirement); United States v.
Hassel, 336 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that a barn was not protected by the statute); United States v. McClard, 462 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that the notice
requirement did not apply to a barn, where the door was already open); United States v.
Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that the notice statute does not protect
businesses).
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The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Fluker,3. found that
18 U.S.C. § 3109 applied to the entrance of a common hallway
which led to two inner apartments. 3C1 In Fluker, where the officers made no attempt to notify occupants of the apartments
prior to breaking into the common hallway, the court held that
the entry violated 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 36 In arriving at its holding,
the court reviewed the decision of Wattenburg v. United
States,37 where the court found that the fourth amendment prohibited an unannounced search and seizure adjacent to a
house. 38 In Wattenburg, the search was found to violate the
fourth amendment because it constituted an intrusion upon
what the resident had sought to perserve as private. 39 The court
in Fluker concluded that in light of Wattenburg, the critical
question in determining whether 18 U.S.C. § 3109 applied to the
common hallway entrance was whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway area.· o The court
determined that the defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area, and consequently found 18 U.S.C. §
3109 applicable to the hallway adjacent to the defendant's
apartment. 41
The Fluker court, noting the absence of any Supreme Court
or federal appellate court precedent, cited United States v.
Blank 42 as the only authority supporting its decision to apply 18
U.S.C. § 3109 to an area other than the home itself.· 3 In Blank,4.
officers broke into a common hallway unannounced, proceeded
to the defendant's apartment door, and broke into the defen34. 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976).
35. Id. at 716-17.
36.Id.
37. 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968).
38. Id. at 858. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
39. 388 F.2d at 857.
40. 543 F.2d at 716.
41. Id. at 716-17.
42. 251 F. Supp. 166 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
43. 543 F.2d at 715.
44. 251 F. Supp. 166.
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dant's apartment unannounced.·1i The defendant contended that
both entries violated the fourth amendment, and that the entry
into his apartment violated a statute prohibiting such unannounced entry.48 Concluding that the officer's unannounced entry into the common hallway was in violation of the fourth
amendment, the court deemed it unnecessary to analyze the officer's second entry into the defendant's apartment. 47 In considering. whether the defendant had a protected interest in the
common hallway,'s the Blank court found that the defendant's
ability to lock the door and to exclude others "denotes a right of
privacy," and that this privacy interest was protected from official unannounced intrusion under the fourth amendment!&
Thus, the Blank court held that under the fourth amendment,
officers must announce their presence, identity and purpose
prior to forceful entry into private premises. lio
The Supreme Court has not considered whether the Fourth
Amendment requires officers to give notice of their authority
and purpose before forcibly entering a dwelling. iiI In Ker v.
United States,1i2 however, Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined
by the three other members of the Court, expressed the opinion
45. Id.at 167.
46. Id. at 168. The statute referred to in Blank is not identified in the opinion.
·47. Id. at 175.
48. Id. at 168-74.
49. The Blank court stated:
The tenants possess a joint right, subject to the landlord's
right to enter and use common portions of the premises, to
exclude from or to admit to those premises whomever they
choose. This area is by no means public. A locked door excluding the public from certain privately owned or leased property
denotes a right of privacy therein to those who have the right
to lock that door.... We hold that the petitioner does possess a protected interest in the integrity of the entire premises.
Id. at 173.
50. In reference to the fourth amendment, the Blank court held:
This constitutional amendment requires that even when warrants are properly issued, the conduct of the executing officers
must not exceed the bounds of reason . . . . Part of the
boundary of reason is formed by the requirement that officers
of the law must announce their presence, identity and purpose
prior to their entrance upon private premises to execute a
search warrant.
Id. at 167.
51. See United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 257 (6th Cir. 1981).
52. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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that the fourth amendment prohibits an unannounced forcible
entry by police officers. 1I8 Justice Marshall in United States v.
Sabbath,1I4 referred to the notice requirement as a "possible constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry,"1I1I indicating that the constitutional basis for the rule is still in question.
The few courts which have confronted the issue have all concurred with Blank, and with Justice Brennan's dissent in Ker,
finding that notice before forced entry is an inherent requirement of the fourth amendment. 1I6
The courts which have held that notice is required under
the fourth amendment additionally have found that notice is
necessary under the federal statute when the area entered is a
house. 1I7 Alternatively, as in Francis v. United States,1I8 the court
may find that although 18 U.S.C. § 3109 does not prevent officers from forcibly entering an area unannounced, the fourth
amendment does prohibit the entry.1I9 In Francis, the Third Circuit found that a barbershop was not included within the meaning of a "house" as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 3109, and was
consequently not protected by the statute. 60 The court alternatively considered whether the fourth amendment prohibited the
officer's unannounced intrusion into the barbershop. The court
found that the fourth amendment did prohibit the intrusion and
held the entry unlawfuJ.61
53. Id. at 46-47.
54. 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
55. Id. at 591.
56. See United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 258 (6th Cir. 1981); and United States v. Gable, 276 F. Supp.
555, 557 (E.D.C. Pa. 1967).
57. See United States v. Price, 441 F. Supp. 814 (D.C. Ark. 1977), where the court
stated that "[iln applying that tradition vis-a-vis either the fourth amendment or § 3109,
courts have consistently held that before. officers enter upon private premises to conduct
a search pursuant to a warrant, they must make an announcement of their identity, authority and purpose for seeking entry, ...." Id. at 817.
58. 646 F.2d 251 (3rd Cir. 1981).
59. Id. See also Wattenburg, where the court stated: "The protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment, insofar as houses are concerned, has never been restricted to the
interior of the house, but has extended to open areas immediately adjacent thereto." 388
F.2d at 857.
60. 646 F.2d at 256.
61. Id. at 257-58. See also United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812 (2nd Cir. 1965)
(holding that the fourth amendment does not protect an apartment dweller from official
intrusion into a common lobby); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976)
(finding that an apartment dweller had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a common
hallway and that the defendant's fourth amendment rights were thus violated by the
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REASONING OF THE COURT

In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit in Moreno
cited three interests protected by 18 U.S.C. § 3109.62 They found
that it "provides protection from violence, assuring the safety
and security of both the occupants and the entering officers;"63
"protects 'the precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle' ";64 and finally that
it "protects against the needless destruction of private property."611 The court held that in accord with these interests, and
contrary to the district court's finding, the defendant did in fact
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove area, and
that the alcove area was actually part of the defendant's apartment. 66 In support of this reasoning, the court noted the defendant's complete control of the gate, his exclusive use of the alcove, that the alcove was formed by three walls. of the
defendant's apartment, and that nonresidents could gain access
into the alcove only after ringing a buzzer located near the
gate. 67 The court noted that these factors, similar to those considered by the court in Fluker,6s indicated a reasonable expectation of privacy.8s The court rejected the lower court's consideration of the visual accessibility of the alcove as a pertinent factor
stating that "[t]he statute expressly applies to windows, clearly
indicating that an officer's ability to see into an area does not
defeat the occupants' privacy and security interests in it."70
Thus, relying on their decision in Fluker,71 the court conofficers' unreasonable intrusion); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956) (applied the fourth amendment to a cave near a dwelling).
62. 701 F.2d at 817.
63. [d. citing United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1973) and
United States v. Fluker, 453 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976).
64. 701 F.2d at 817 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958».
65. 701 F.2d at 817 (citing Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, and United States v.
Crawford, 657 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1981».
66. 701 F.2d at 817.
67. [d.
68. 543 F.2d 709. In Fluker, the court noted that there were only three apartments
in the building entered by the officers, the outer door of the building was kept locked,
only the three apartment residents had keys, and the defendant's apartment was within
reach of the outer door. [d. at 716.
69. 701 F.2d at 817.
70. [d.
71. 543 F.2d 709.
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eluded that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove, and also that the alcove was a part of the
defendant's apartment. Since the alcove was considered part of
the defendant's apartment, the court found that the officers
should have complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3109 before entering
through the gate. 72
D.

ANALYSIS

The court in Moreno mistakenly relied on Fluker 73' in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to 18 U.S.C. §
3109. In addition, factors cited by the court fail to establish that
the alcove outside the defendant's apartment should be considered as part of the defendant's apartment. Finally, the court's
improper extension of the statute appears to have been unnecessary in light of an analagous line of cases which have applied the
fourth amendment to similar facts.
The Moreno court, in determining that the reasonable expectation of privacy test was applicable under the statute, improperly relied upon the Fluker court's mistaken application of
the test to the statute. The Ninth Circuit in Fluker determined
that, according to its decision in Wattenburg v. United States,74
the appropriate test in determining if an area was protected by
18 U.S.C. § 3109 was whether the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that area. 711 The court in Fluker however, failed to recognize that the decision in Wattenburg involved an open area 20-35 feet from the defendant's home, and
was based solely on the fourth amendment rights of the defendant. 78 Wattenburg did not involve the application of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109. Similarly, the Fluker court mistakenly found that the
72. 701 F.2d at 817. After finding that the statute did apply to the alcove area, the
court considered the government's contention that the inevitable discovery doctrine was
applicable and warranted admission of the evidence. [d. at 819. The court rejected this
argument stating that the inevitable discovery doctrine "requires that the otherwise
inadmissible evidence would have been discovered independently by legal means . . . .
Because we do not view the second entry as independent of the unlawful entry, we do
not apply the 'inevitable discovery' rule." [d.
73. 543 F.2d 709.
74. 388 F.2d 853.
75. 543 F.2d at 716 (citing Wattenburg, 388 F.2d at 857).
76. 388 F.2d at 858.
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decision in Blank 77 applied 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to an outer door of
an apartment building. 78 Although the defendant in Blank
claimed both a statutory and a fourth amendment violation,79
the court based the decision solely on the fourth amendment. 8o
The Fluker court was thus the first court to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test to 18 U.S.C. § 3109, and it appears to have done so under the mistaken impression that the
courts in Blank and Wattenburg had done the same. 8} Consequently, by applying Fluker, the Moreno court has relied on a
mistaken determination that the reasonable expectation of privacy test had been applied to 18 U.S.C. § 3109.
It is well established that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is appropriate in determining whether an area is protected under the fourth amendment. 82 It is not clear that the
same test is appropriate in determining whether an area is protected under 18 U.S.C. § 3109.
The court in Fluker determined that where a defendant had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area outside his apartment, that area was covered by the statute. 83 In relying on the
reasonable expectation test in Fluker, the court in Moreno fails
to recognize that although a person will typically maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area constituting his or her
home, the same person may also have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a variety of other areas such as a phone booth,8" a
public restroom,811 or an automobile. 8s Clearly these areas cannot
be considered part of a home.
The reasonable expectation of privacy test employed by the
Ninth Circuit in Moreno is thus overly broad, and does not provide an exclusive factor indicating that an area should be consid77. 251 F. Supp. 166.
78. 543 F.2d at 715.
79. 251 F. Supp. at 168.
80. Id. at 175.
81. See United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, where the court notes the absence of
any cases, with the exception of Blank, 251 F. Supp. 166, which expand the application
of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 beyond the entrance of a home or dwelling. 543 F.2d at 715.
82. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83. 543 F.2d at 716.
84. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
85. State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205 (1970).
86. Coolidge v. New Hantpshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971).
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ered part of a home, or covered under the statute.
The court in Fluker cited several factors which supported
its finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the common hallway.87 The court found that based on
this reasonable expectation of privacy, the common hallway was
protected under the statute. 88 The court in Moreno took this
reasoning one step further and found that the factors indicating
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove also indicated that the alcove was actually part of the defendant's apartment. 89 Thus, the court found the alcove protected under the statute because it was considered part of the
defendant's apartment. 90 Though factors cited by the court indicate the defendant may have had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the alcove area, there is no indication that the alcove
was actually part of the defendant's apartment.
Exclusive control and access to the area indicate that the
defendant may have expected the alcove to remain free from unreasonable intrusion, but these factors do not change the physical structure of the apartment. The alcove outside the defendant's apartment does not become a part of the defendant's
apartment merely because it is in the defendant's exclusive control. Exclusive control is typically exercised by the possessor of
real and personal property, however it cannot be assumed that
property in one's exclusive control is automatically part of one's
home.
The court also found it significant that the alcove was
formed of three outer walls of the defendant's apartment. 91 The
code specifically provides for protection of areas within the
home, but makes no provision for protection of areas adjacent to
the outer walls of a home. 92 The alcove provided access to the
solid front door, and the solid front door provided access to the
defendant's apartment. 93 The court cited no facts to indicate the
87. See supra note 59.
88. 543 F.2d at 716.
89. 701 F.2d at 817.
90.Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra note 2.
93. 701 F.2d at 816.
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defendant used the alcove for any purpose other than gaining
access to his front door. Though the alcove, just as a sidewalk or
driveway, may have been used to gain access to a dwelling, there
is no indication that the alcove was actually a part of the apartment and thus covered under the statute.
Although the Supreme Court has not held that notice is required under the fourth amendment,9. lower court decisions
dealing with the issue indicate a trend toward finding such a requirement. 9& According to these courts, the fourth amendment
requires that officers give notice of their authority and purpose
before entering an area in which a person maintains a reasonable
expectation of privacy.96 These courts require notice regardless
of whether the area entered by officers was found to be part of a
house. 97 Thus, under this view, an unannounced forcible entry
into a home would be prohibited by both the fourth amendment
and by 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 98 However, an unannounced entry into
an area adjacent to a house would be covered by the Fourth
Amendment, but would not be covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 99
The legislative intent and historical application of the statute
indicate that the statute was intended to protect the home
only.loo Consequently, the fourth amendment is the only appropriate protection to apply when confronted with an official
unannounced entry into an area adjacent to a house.
The Ninth Circuit in Wattenburg v. United States,lOl found
that the fourth amendment protected an open area used to store
wood, located approximately 20-35 feet from the defendant's
home, from a warrantless intrusion. The Wattenburg court
found that the appropriate test in determining if a search and
seizure adjacent to a house was constitutionally forbidden was
whether it constituted an intrusion upon what the resident
sought to preserve as private. l02 In Blank,103 relied upon by the
94. See supra p.6.
95. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
96. [d.

97. See supra note 59.
98. See supra note 57.
99. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussion of Francis).
100. See supra notes 22 and 25.
101. 388 F.2d at 853.
102. [d. at 857.
103. 251 F. Supp. 166.
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Ninth Circuit in Fluker,104 the court stated that under the
fourth amendment, officers were required to give notice of their
authority and purpose before entering a common area shared by
apartment residents. 1011 The court in Moreno found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area, the
area was adjacent to the defendant's apartment, and the area
was entered by officials without announcement. Thus, as in
Wattenburg and Blank, the fourth amendment would have sufficiently protected the alcove from an unreasonable intrusion, and
an extended application of the statute was unnecessary.

It is unclear why the Ninth Circuit chose to apply the federal statue to the facts in Moreno rather than apply the fourth
amendment as it did in Wattenburg. Given the current trend of
applying the fourth amendment to facts similar to those in
Moreno,106 it appears that the Ninth Circuit should have applied
the fourth amendment, and thus avoided straining the federal
statute.
Thomas M. Hostetler*

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
PROCEDURE

IN

CRIMINAL

LAW

&

A. Grand Jury Witnesses' Right to Inspect Government
Documents

In In re McElhinney,! the Ninth Circuit held that a grand
jury witness is entitled to conditional access to government documents for the purpose of challenging the legality of the government's wiretapping of his telephone.
The witness, Todd McElhinney, refused to testify before a
104. 543 F.2d at 715.
105. 251 F. Supp. 167. See supra note 40.
106. See supra pp. 6-7.
* Hastings College of the Law, Class of 1985.
1. 698 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, J., the other panel members were
Skopil and Boochever, J.J.) (as revised Jan. 31, 1983).
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federal grand jury, claiming that the questions asked were based
on information obtained from the government's illegal monitoring of his telephone conversations. 2 After the government admitted using a court-ordered wiretap, McElhinney requested disclosure of government documents for a limited hearing on the
legality of the wiretap. 3 The trial court denied McElhinney's request concluding that an in camera inspection of the documents
was sufficient to determine the legality of the wiretap.· When
McElhinney persisted in his refusal to testify, the court held
him in contempt and ordered him confined. Ii McElhinney appealed the confinement order.8
In several previous cases, the Ninth Circuit rejected a ple'nary suppression hearing on the wiretap issue because such a
hearing would disrupt and delay the grand jury investigation. 7
In these rulings, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's
holding in In re Persico. s The Persico court held a witness is not
entitled to a plenary suppression hearing on the issue of whether
the questions posed are the product of unlawful electronic
surveillance. 9
In McElhinney, the Ninth Circuit distinguished earlier
cases which denied hearings, noting that McElhinney requested
a limited, not a plenary, hearing. lo The Ninth Circuit found in
the Persico reasoning a balance between the competing policies
2. Id. at 384. McElhinney had been granted immunity before being ordered to tes.
3. Id. McElhinney requested the application of the Attorney General for authorization to conduct the wiretap, the affidavit in support of the application, the court order
authorizing the wiretap, and the affidavit describing the duration of the wiretap. Id.
4. Id. at 385. The trial court concluded that further review of the matter would
unduly delay the grand jury proceedings. Id.
5. Id. at 384.
6.Id.
7. Droback v. United States, 509 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964
(1975) (no plenary challenge was permitted), In re Gordon, 534 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1976)
(the court allowed no plenary hearing on the issue of availability of alternative investigative techniques at the time the court-ordered electronic surveillance), United States v.
Canon, 534 F.2d 139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976) (a witness was not
allowed to delay a grand jury hearing by litigating the validity of the surveillance).
8. 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 (1974).
9. Id. at 1162. But ct. In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974), in which the
First Circuit allowed access to government documents for a limited hearing absent a
government need for secrecy. 497 F.2d at 807.
10. 698 F.2d at 385.
~U
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of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence and the demand for
unimpeded grand jury proceedings, with the balance weighing in
favor of unimpeded grand jury proceedings. l l The court noted
that granting McElhinney a limited hearing would not upset this
balance, as the short time spent on a limited hearing promotes
the policy of excluding illegally obtained evidence.12 The Ninth
Circuit held that McElhinney had the right to examine the requested documents,18 but he could not use any additional evidence to support his challenge of the wiretap. 14
The court ruled that if the government objects to disclosure
on security grounds,1& the district court must determine in camera the sensitivity of the documents. IS The witness is then allowed to inspect relevant documents judged not sensitive. I '1
Accordingly, McElhinney establishes that a witness in the
Ninth Circuit may inspect government documents when challenging a court-ordered I8 wiretap he or she contends is illegal.

B. The Pretextual Use of a Warrant to Justify a Custodial
Detention Violates the Fourth Amendment
In United States v. Prim,1 the Ninth Circuit held that federal agents could not rely on an outstanding nonsupport warrant
to justify a custodial detention where the agents stated that
their actual purpose for the detention was to interrogate and
search a suspected narcotics trafficker. The court stated that
such a pretextual justification for an arrest or search violates the
fourth amendment.
11. [d.
12. [d.

13. See supra note 3.
14. 698 F.2d at 385-86.
15. [d. at 385.
16. [d.
17. [d.

18. The Supreme Court has ruled that a grand jury witness may use an unauthorized wiretap as a defense to a contempt charge for refusal to testify. Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). The Court specifically left to trial courts the decision to allow
testimony based on court-ordered wiretaps. 408 U.S. at 61, n.22.

1. 698 F.2d 972 (9th ('ir. 1983) (per Takasugi, D.J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Hug, J., concurring, and Alarcon, J., dissenting).
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While the defendant waited at the Portland airport for a
plane to Honolulu, his nervous behavior aroused the suspicion of
police who subsequently placed him under surveillance. After
departing on his flight, the police relayed information that the
defendant had been involved in a 1979 narcotics investigation to
DEA agents in Honolulu. 2 Portland police then discovered an
outstanding Oregon nonsupport warrant for the defendant.Police also relayed information to the Hawaiian agents about the
warrant. 3
Upon arrival at the Honolulu airport, DEA agents stopped
the defendant and checked his identification. After informing
him of their suspicion that he was trafficking in narcotics, they
escorted him to an "office.'" The warrant for nonsupport was
not mentioned. In the interrogation room, agents asked the defendant twice to consent to a search of his person and effects,
but both times he refused. The agents had the defendant empty
his pockets. In doing so, he neglected to remove an envelope
which caused a bulge in a front pocket.1I After conducting a patdown search and removing the envelope which later turned out
to be cocaine, the agents arrested the defendant. The District
Court found that the detention and search did not violate the
defendant's fourth amendment rights because of the Oregon arrest warrant. 8 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, defendant contended that the detention constituted an arrest without probable cause since the agents detained him for no other reason than
to conduct a custodial interrogation and to obtain consent to
search his person and property.7
According to the Ninth Circuit, the record established that
the agents' actions were motivated only by their suspicion that
the defendant was a drug trafficker. Judge Takasugi, writing for
the Court, rejected the government's contention that the warrant provided probable cause for the agents' actions. 8 He stated
that although probable cause is judicially viewed under an objec2. Id. at 973-74.
3. Id. at 974.
4. Id.
S.Id.
6. Id. at 975.
7. Id.
8.Id.
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tive standard "the nonsupport warrant was not the cause of the
officers' action and thus not the cause to which the objective
standard should be applied."e Judge Takasugi reasoned that, if
anything, the warrant provided a pretext after the fact to justify
the agents' actions, and such pretextual use violates the fourth
amendment. 1o
Finding no probable cause, Judge Takasugi next focused on
the defendant's detention in the interrogation room. In light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Dunaway v. New York,ll Judge
Takasugi determined that the detention constituted custodial
interrogation, which like an arrest required justification with
probable cause. 12 He distinguished the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Mendenhall/ 3 which upheld a consensual
relocation to an airport interrogation room, by noting that here
there was no evidence that the defendant consented to the relocation and detention for interrogation. Judge Takasugi pointed
out that even if the relocation were constitutional, the continued
detention after the defendant's refusal to consent to a search
constituted custodial interrogation without probable cause under
the reasoning of Dunaway and Chamberlin. 1I1 He reasoned that

I.

9. [d. Judge Takasugi emphasized that he did not mean to base probable cause on
the subjective state of mind of the officers. [d.
10. [d. (emphasis added). See, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976).
11. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, the Court held that the relocation of a suspect
to police headquarters for custodial interrogation requires probable cause. The Court
reasoned that a detention for custodial interrogation intrudes so severely on interests
protected by the fourth amendment that it necessarily"triggers the traditional safeguards
against illegal arrest. [d.
12. 698 F.2d at 976-77.
13. 446 U.S. 544. In Mendenhall, the defendant was stopped in the airport as she
got off a plane and subsequently relocated to the DEA office for questioning. After finding the initial stop valid the Court validated the relocation stating that the evidence was
sufficient to support a finding that the defendant voluntarily consented to the relocation.
[d.

14, 698 F.2d at 976-77. Judge Takasugi made it clear that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
which allows a "stop" based on articulable suspicion, did not apply to the relocation
since it involved a greater intrusion than a brief investigatory stop. 698 F.2d at 977.
Judge Takasugi followed United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1980)
(twenty-minute detention of suspect in back of police car while officer searched for suspect's companion was detention for custodial detention) and distinguished United States
v. Post, 607 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1979) (relocation of a suspect to an airport interview room
based upon articulable suspicion valid where there was no explicit finding of
involuntariness).
15. 698 F.2d at 977.
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the subsequent pat-down search was unjustified, and the cocaine
taken from the defendant was thereby tainted by the illegal detention. ls Further, Judge Takasugi stated that the pat-down
search could not be justified because the agents actually expected to find narcotics in the bulge of the defendant's pocket. A
pat-down, he stated, is properly limited only to a search for
weapons. 17
Judge Hug concurred with the majority opinion that even if
the relocation was constitutional, the continued detention constituted custodial interrogation without probable cause. IS He
also agreed that the government's reliance on the warrant to
provide probable cause for the detention represented ~n after
the fact justification for an unlawful search. He stated that an
arrest cannot be used as a pretext to search for evidence of an
unrelated crime. IS
Judge Alarcon, dissenting, maintained that the majority improperly based probable cause for arrest upon the agent's subjective state of mind. 20 He stated that the probable cause determination must be based on objective facts that could justify the
issuance of a warrant, not on the agent's subjective state of
mind. 21 Applying this standard, he· reasoned that the objective
facts known to the agents prior to the detention and search, including the outstanding warrant, established probable cause to
arrest. 22 Since by his analysis the arrest was lawful, Judge Alarcon found the subsequent search of the defendant justified as a
search incident to arrest. 23
Judge Alarcon disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
16. Id. at 977. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
17. 698 F.2d at 977. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
18. 698 F.2d at 978.
19. Id. at 978. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932); Williams v.
United States, 418 F.2d 159, 161 (9th Cir. 1969) aff'd 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
Judge Hug, in his concurrence, also asserted that the DEA agents were without
power to arrest the defendant on state charges. See 21 U.S.C. § 878 which limits the
authority of federal law enforcement officers. See also, United States v. Diamond, 471
F.2d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
20. 698 F.2d at 980 (emphasis in original).
21. Id. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982).
22. 698 F.2d at 980.
23. Id. at 979. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
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the agents used the nonsupport warrant as a pretext for the
search. 24 He believed that the record demonstrated that the
agents had acted in complete good faith and exhibited great sensitivity in choosing the least intrusive means of interfering with
the rights of an individual under suspicion. He stated that the
agents could have made an immediate and embarrassing arrest
in the middle of the airport, but instead chose to make a quiet
and discreet request of the defendant in the hope that he would
consent to a search. Judge Alarcon reasoned that this conduct
did not violate the fourth amendment, which prohibits only unreasonable law enforcement conduct. 2 &
C.

Waiver of Counsel

In Evans v. Raines,l the Ninth Circuit held that a limited
retrospective state court hearing is sufficient to determine
whether the defendant is competent to waive counsel and
whether a waiver was intelligently made.
The defendant was charged with rape and kidnaping for
rape. Based on psychiatric evaluations, the state court found the
defendant competent to stand trial. When the defendant asked
to represent himself, the court admonished him of the risks and
responsibilities of self representation. 2 However, the court
neither informed the defendant of the maximum punishment for
the offenses charged, nor held a hearing to determine defend~nt's competency to represent himself. The defendant was convicted on both counts. 3
The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arizona. 4 The defendant filed a habeus corpus petition in the district court, contending that the trial record did not disclose
24. 698 F.2d at 980.
25. [d. In response to Judge Hug's assertion that the federal agents lacked authority
to arrest pursuant to the Oregon arrest warrant, Judge Alarcon maintained that the
agents were authorized to make arrests under a Hawaiian statute. In addition, he noted
that a Hawaiian police officer who had authority to arrest pursuant to the Oregon war·
rant was present at the defendant's detention and search. [d. at 979.
1. 705 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Smith, J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Merri!, J. and Boochever, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
2. [d. at 1482.
3. [d. at 1480.
4. State v. Evans, 125 Ariz. 401, 610 P.2d 35 (1980).
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whether defendant was competent to waive counselor whether
the waiver was intelligently made. Ii The district court ordered
defendant's'release unless proceedings for a new trial were commenced, and the state appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
In reviewing the district court's order, the Ninth Circuit
stated that a defendant cannot intelligently waive counsel unless
he is apprised of the penalties which may be imposed for the
crimes which he is charged. Because the state court provided no
such information, the court noted that the defendant could not
have intelligently waived counsel. s
On the issue of competency to waive counsel, the court, citing Westbrook v. Arizona,7 noted that a higher level of competency is required to waive counsel than is necessary to stand
trial. In absence of findings or a hearing on defendant's competency to waive counsel, it was necessary to remand to state court
so this determination could be made. 8
In deciding whether a new trial was necessary, or whether a
limited remand would suffice, the court cited United States v.
Kimmel. 9 In Kimmel, the court held that a limited remand is
proper to supplement a record that does not show a knowing
and intelligent waiver of counsel. 10
The court further stated that a retrospective competency
hearing is sufficient to determine if a defendant is competent to
waive counsel. The court, relying upon two decisions involving
guilty pleas,11 found no reason for applying a different rule
where competency to waive counsel is at issue.12 Accordingly, the
case was remanded to district court with directions to send the
case to state court for a further hearing to hold a competency
hearing.
5. Evans v. Raines, 534 F.Supp. 791 (D. Ariz. 1982).
6. 705 F.2d at 1480.
7. 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
8. 705 F.2d at 1480.
9. 672 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1982).
10. Id. at 722-23.
11. Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981) and Sieling v. Eymin, 478
F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
12. 705 F.2d at 1481.
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Judge Merrill, concurring, suggested that when counsel is
waived that the colloquy between court and defendant be placed
on the record. 13 He noted that this would eliminate the need for
further litigation in such cases to determine if the waiver was
made intelligently.14 However, he would not require that such a
record be made as a matter of constitutional right. 111
Judge Boochever, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
questioned the propriety of holding a competency hearing at this
point in the litigation. IS He stated that if this were a federal case
he would simply affirm the district court's order. He noted, however, that since this was a state case, the decision on the feasibility of holding such a hearing should be left to the state court.17

13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16. Id. at 1482.
17. Id.
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